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PRIVACY
CHARLES E. CANTU*

INTRODUCTION

In 1960, Dean Prosser' published his now famous law review article, Privacy,2 which set forth a new definition of the term "privacy" for
the American common law system. 3 In so doing, he drew on the resources provided by previous commentators 4 and court decisions, 5 and
concluded that an invasion of one's privacy did not involve one tort,
"but a complex of four." He enumerated them as being: 1) intrusion
upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; 2)
public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; 3)
publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye;
for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's
and 4) appropriation,
7
name or likeness.

* Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law. B.A., University of
Texas; J.D., St. Mary's University; M.C.L., Southern Methodist University; L.L.M.,
University of Michigan; Fulbright Scholar. The author would like to express special
appreciation to his research assistant, Greg Perkes, for his work, dedication and loyalty
during the writing of this article.
1. William Lloyd Prosser (b. March 15, 1898, in New Albany, Indiana; d. May
21, 1972, in Berkeley, California) was a prominent legal educator and authority in the
field of torts. It is in that field where Prosser's work as a legal educator and scholar is
most widely known. Prosser's LAW OF TORTS (1941) and his CASES ON THE LAW OF
TORTS (1952), have become classic texts used in the education of law students.
2. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
3. See id. at 388-89. Prosser noted that as of 1960, there were over 300 cases on
the right of privacy and that as such, the "holes in the jigsaw puzzle [had] been largely
filled in." Id. at 389.
4. Many legal scholars had written on the subject of privacy before Dean Prosser. A partial list of such articles would include: Anderson, Origin of Privacy as a
Legal Right to U.S., 23 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 106 (1946); Dickler, Right of Privacy:
A Proposed Redefinition, 70 U.S. L. REV. 435 (1936); Feinberg, Recent Developments
in the Law of Privacy, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 713 (1948); Hurley, Privacy, 13 CORNELL
L. REV.. 469 (1928); Larremore, The Law of Privacy, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 693 (1912);

Nizer, Right of Privacy: A Half Century's Developments, 39 MICH. L. REV. 526
(1941); Ragland, The Right of Privacy, 17 Ky. L.J. 85 (1929); Note, The Right of
Privacy: Fifty Years After, 15 TEMP. L.Q. 148 (1940); Seavey, Can Texas Courts Protect Newly DiscoveredInterests?, 31 TEx. L. REv. 309 (1953); Yankwich, The Right of
Privacy: Its Development, Scope, and Limitations, 27 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 499
(1952).
5. See Prosser, supra note 2, at 388.
6. See id. at 389.
7. The elements of these four types of invasions of one's right to be left alone are
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It was noted that these four torts involved distinct invasions into
four different interests of the plaintiff, but were nevertheless tied together by one name." In addition, each represented an interference with
the plaintiff's "right to be let alone." 9 This classification was soon
adopted by the Restatement of Torts, 10 and in virtually every jurisdiction in the United States." There was no question that Prosser's apas follows. Intrusion: (1) An intrusion, (2) into plaintiff's private life, (3) which would
offend a reasonable person. Disclosure: (1) publication, (2) of plaintiff's private affairs,
(3) which would offend a reasonable person, (4) that is not of legitimate public concern. False Light: (1) a falsehood, (2) that is published, (3) that would be offensive to
a reasonable person. Appropriation:(1) identification of the plaintiff, (2) appropriation
of his identity, (3) a benefit received by the defendant. See generally W. KEETON, D.
DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 851-66 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS].

8. Id.
9. Judge Cooley had, as far back as 1888, coined this phrase. He had taken
note of the fact that there was some authority for this proposition. See T. COOLEY,
COOLEY ON TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
11. The following states have recognized the independent right of privacy. In
alphabetical order they are: Smith v. Doss, 37 So.2d 118 (Ala. 1948); Smith v. Suratt,
7 Alaska 416 (D. Alaska 1926); Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co., 162 P.2d 133
(Ariz. 1945); Olan Mills Inc. of Texas v. Dodd, 353 S.W.2d 22 (Ark. 1962); Gill v.
Curtis Pub. Co., 239 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1952); Rugg v. McCarty, 476 P.2d 753 (Colo.
1970); Korn v. Rennison, 156 A.2d 476 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1959); Barbieri v. News
Journal Company, 189 A.2d 773 (Del. 1963); Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78 F. Supp. 305
(D.D.C. 1948); Cason v. Baskin, 20 So.2d 243 (Fla. 1944); Pavesich v. New England
Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905); Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates,
441 P.2d 141 (Hawaii 1968); Peterson v. Idaho First National Bank, 367 P.2d 284
(Idaho 1961); Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 106 N.E.2d 742 (I11.
App. Ct. 1952); Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 86 N.E.2d 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 1949); Bremmer v. JournalTribune Pub. Co., 76 N.W.2d 762 (Iowa 1956); Kunz v. Allen, 172 P. 532 (Kan.
1918); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364 (Ky. 1909); Itzkovitch v. Whitaker,
39 So. 499 (La. 1905); Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792 (Me. 1976); Carr v. Watkins, 177 A.2d 841 (Md. 1962); Pallas v. Crowley, Milner and Co., 33 N.W.2d 911
(Mich. 1948); Martin v. Dorton, 50 So.2d 391 (Miss. 1951); Munden v. Harris, 134
S.W. 1076 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911); Welsh v. Pritchard, 241 P.2d 816 (Mont. 1952);
Norman v. City of Las Vegas, 177 P.2d 442 (Nev. 1947); Hamberger v. Eastman, 206
A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964); Edison v. Edison Polyform and Mfg. Co., 67 A. 392 (N.J.
1907); Montgomery Ward v. Larragoite, 467 P.2d 399 (N.M. 1970); N.Y. Civ.
RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1988); Flake v. Greensboro News
Co., 195 S.E. 55 (N.C. 1938); Friedman v. Cincinnati Local Joint Exec. Board, 6 Ohio
Supp. 276, 20 Ohio Op. 473 (1941); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 839-840 (West
1958); Hinish v. Meier and Frank Co., 113 P.2d 438 (Or. 1941); Bennett v. Norban,
151 A.2d 476 (Pa. 1959); Holloman v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 7 S.E.2d 169 (S.C.
1940); Truxes v. Kenco Enterprises, Inc., 119 N.W.2d 914 (S.D. 1963); Langford v.
Vanderbilt University, 287 S.W.2d 32 (Tenn. 1956); Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d
858 (Tex. 1973); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-4-8, 76-4-9 (1983); VA. CODE § 8-650
(1957); Eastwood v. Cascade Broadcasting Company, 708 P.2d 1216 (Wash. Ct. App.
1986); Roach v. Harper, 105 S.E.2d 564 (W.Va. 1958); Hirsh v. S.C. Johnson & Son,
Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979).
The following states have not recognized the independent right to privacy. In al-
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proach was a convenient system that brought sense to an area of the
law 12 that was often referred to as a "haystack in a hurricane." 1 Its
general acceptance is proof of that.
Three significant events, however, have occurred since Prosser's
law review article was published which cast serious doubt as to whether
this classification is still as appropriate today as it was a quarter of a
century ago. One event has been the entry of the Supreme Court of the
United States into this area dealing with an individual's right to privacy. "4' The result being that the right to privacy has emerged, not only
as a common law right, but a constitutional one as well. The second
event is the emergence of the electronic data processing industry as an
integral part of the daily life of every man, woman, and child on the
face of the earth. 5 The electronics age has arrived, and in so doing has
changed our lives as well as our outlook to the future.'6 America has

phabetical order they are: Frick v. Boyd, 214 N.E.2d 460 (Mass. 1966); House v.
Sports Films & Talents, Inc., 351 N.W.2d 684 (Minn. 1984); Brunson v. Ranks Army
Store, 73 N.W.2d 803 (Neb. 1955); Volk v. Auto-Dine Corp., 177 N.W.2d 525 (N.D.
1970); Kalian v. People Acting Through Community Effort, Inc., 408 A.2d 608 (R.I.
1979).
There is no case law in Vermont on the subject of an individual's right to privacy.
Although there is no case law in Wyoming, some writers believe that Wyoming would
recognize the tort should the issue ever be presented. See Note, Truthful Libel and
Right of Privacy in Wyoming, I1WyO. L.J. 184 (1957).
12. See Note, Protecting the Dignity of Privacy Law: The Need for Connecticut
to Reexamine Its Adoption of the Restatement, 18 CONN. L. REv. 621, 626 (1986).
13. The state of the law referring to an individual's right of privacy was first
described in this manner in Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Co., 229 F.2d 481,
485 (3d. Cir. 1956).
14.
Not long after 1950, the Supreme Court of the United States began, in
cases of criminal prosecutions raising questions about improper actions of
government officers, to talk of a "constitutional" right of privacy which protected the individual against such acts. These were cases of what might
fairly be called "intrusions," but in Griswold v. Connecticut, in 1965, the
Court held unconstitutional a statute prohibiting the giving of contraceptive
information on the ground that it deprived married couples of a "right to
privacy" guaranteed by the Constitution. The "zone of privacy," so to speak,
that is now safeguarded by the Constitution when state action is involved
has been enlarged in recent years. It embraces not only the interests protected by the common law action . . . but it also protects to a considerable
extent the autonomy of the individual to make certain important decisions of
a very personal nature. This latter interest-the personal autonomy interest-generally relates to matters of marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education.
PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 7, at 866.
15. See Note, Privacy, Computerized Information Systems, and the Common
Law-A Comparative Study in the PrivateSector, 18 GONz. L. REV. 567 (1982-83).
16. See A. TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE 26-27 (1980). Toffier argues that today
we are viewing the impact of the third tidal wave of change in our history; the first was
launched by the agricultural revolution; the second, by the industrial revolution; and
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become a nation wherein the dissemination of information is big business, 17 and as a result individuals need protection now more than ever
before to insure their right of privacy. The third event is the creation of
new causes of action for an invasion of one's privacy due to technological advances and changes in the American lifestyle. 18 For example,
suits involving an employer's right to test an employee's urine for drugs
or alcohol are beginning to appear.19 Is this an invasion to one's right to
the third is the impending revolution brought about by the electronics age.
Until now the human race has undergone two great waves of change,
each one largely obliterating earlier cultures or civilizations and replacing
them with ways of life inconceivable to those who came before. The First
Wave of change-the agricultural revolution-took thousands of years to
play itself out. The Second Wave-the rise of industrial civilization-took a
mere three hundred years. Today history is even more accelerative, and it is
likely that the Third Wave will sweep across history and complete itself in a
few decades. We, who happen to share the planet at this explosive moment,
will therefore feel the full impact of the Third Wave in our own lifetimes.
Tearing our families apart, rocking our economy, paralyzing our political systems, shattering our values, the Third Wave affects everyone. It challenges all the old power relationships, the privileges and prerogatives of the
endangered elites of today, and provides the backdrop against which the key
power struggles of tomorrow will be fought.
Much in this emerging civilization contradicts the old traditional industrial civilization. It is, at one and the same time, highly technological and
anti-industrial.
The Third Wave brings with it a genuinely new way of life based on
diversified, renewable energy sources; on methods of production that make
most factory assembly lines obsolete; on new, non-nuclear families; on a
novel institution that might be called the "electronic cottage;" and on radically changed schools and corporations of the future. The emergent civilization writes a new code of behavior for us and carries us beyond standardization, synchronization, and centralization, beyond the concentration of
energy, money, and power.
Id.
17. See, e.g., Note, supra note 15, at 568-70.
18. See, e.g., Note, Workers, Drinks, and Drugs: Can Employers Test?, 55 U.
CIN. L. REV. 127, 131 (1986):
As with federal law, the right to privacy under state law does not extend to all situations in which an individual's privacy is affected. Under
most states' laws, an individual can state a cause of action for tortious invasion of privacy by showing that his private affairs were publicized or by
showing that someone intruded into his private affairs in such a manner as
to outrage a reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities. However, where drug
and alcohol testing is conducted confidentially and for a legitimate business
purpose, courts may be reluctant to find an invasion of privacy.
The author then cites Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 617 F. Supp.
1359, 1369 (D.S.C. 1985) wherein the South Carolina federal district court held that
an employee had not established a cause of action when he alleged an invasion of privacy due to a urine test. The court held that there was no publicity of the employee's
private affairs because only a small group of people knew of the test results and there
was no evidence of mental suffering or humiliation.
19. See Note, supra note 18.
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be left alone, and if it is, can the injured party recover for his invasion
of privacy? Some commentators are saying that the present state of the
law does not cover this type of cause of action, 0 and as a result a new
standard for determining an invasion of privacy is needed.
The premise of this Article, therefore, is that a new definition pertaining to an individual's right to be left alone should be formulated.
The new standard that should be adopted in determining whether an
individual's right of privacy has been violated is that of the reasonably
prudent person. In other words, whether the conduct or activity in
question constitutes an invasion of one's right to live a life free of interference from outside agencies should depend upon the reasonableness
of the conduct or activity under the circumstances in question.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Before 1890, the idea that one had a right to privacy was virtually
unheard of in the United States. The concept had gained acceptance in
continental Europe, 21 but across the waters in the United States, and in
England, the common law was concerned with other ideas. Writers of
the day were more concerned with the concept of liberty for all people
rather than with the concept of liberty for the individual; furthermore,
society had not yet become so complex that the individual's right to be
left alone was in danger of encroachment. 22 The issue of an individual's
right to privacy had been presented in courts of law and in many instances relief was granted. Such relief was, however, always granted on
other generally accepted principles even though there was a feeling by
some writers that the right to privacy should be recognized on its own
merits.23 Apparently, the reason for skirting the issue was that both of
20. Id.
21. See preface to S.

HOFSTADTER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN NEW YORK (1954).

22. See Nizer, supra note 4. Nizer stated that the right of privacy was not discussed in the works of the great 17th and 18th century political philosophers-Hobbs,
Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Spencer, and Paine. Id. at 526. Theorizing on various

topics such as "natural rights," "the state of nature," "social contract" and "the inalienable rights of man," these writers were concerned only with the capacity of the
state to deprive the liberties of the people; society had not yet evolved to the state

where the individual's privacy was in danger of encroachment. Id.
23.

See Pound, Interests of Personality, 28

HARV.

L. REV. 343, 363 (1915),

arguring that:
[A] legal right of privacy . . . [had] not been recognized

. . .'.

For the

most part the interest [had] been secured incidentally, as it were, by taking
account of infringement thereof as an element of damage where well-recog-

nized legal rights [had] also been violated, rather than by establishing a
legal right of privacy a violation whereof should constitute a cause of action.

But while the law is slow in recognizing this interest as something to be
secured in and of itself, it would seem that the aggressions of a type of
unscrupulous journalism, the invasions of privacy by reporters in competi-
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these common law countries were, at the time, enjoying what can best
be described as a rural civilization. 4 For better or worse, there was no
need for a cause of action designed to protect an individual's right to be
left alone; and as has been shown, when such an injury did occur, it
could be resolved on the basis of some other generally accepted principle such as a property interest.25
With the approach of the Twentieth Century, however, the face of
the world began to change. The Industrial Revolution as well as the
development and employment of a wide reaching railroad system took
effect in both England and the United States. Great urban centers were
emerging. There was, at first, a slow move from rural areas to the cities. In time this move was accelerated, and as a result, the lifestyle in
America began to change. Individuals were having to adapt themselves
to their new complex surroundings; life was no longer slow and easy.
Society had reached a point in which the communications systems-especially news printing-allowed almost everyone to know almost everything about almost anyone. It was in light of these changes
that Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis collaborated on the writing of
their now famous law review article concerning the right of privacy. 26
In a relatively small amount of space, twenty-eight pages, these
two individuals set out their premise, argument, and conclusion as to a
wrong which up to that time had not been recognized in a common law
court. They began with the basic proposition that political, social, and
economic changes require the recognition of new rights, and that the
common law, while adhering to precedent, is an ever-changing demand
of society. In supporting this premise, they noted that in its earliest
form the law gave a remedy only for physical interference to life and
property. From this point, the law grew to consider man's spiritual nature, so that in time there was not only an action for battery but for
assault as well. It was due to this recognition of man's feelings, his
intellect, and his nature in general, that caused the law to evolve so as
to recognize actions for nuisance, libel, slander, and alienation of
spousal affection. As the law advanced, it also expanded its legal conception of property; from corporeal property to incorporeal issues such
as goodwill, trade secrets, and trademarks. From this basic premise,
tion for a "story," the activities of photographers, and the temptation to
advertisers to sacrifice private feelings to their individual gain call upon the
law to do more in the attempt to secure this interest than merely take incidental account of infringements of it. A man's feelings are as much a part of
his personality as his limbs. The actions that protect the latter from injury
may well be made to protect the former by the ordinary process of legal
growth. The problems are rather to devise suitable redress and to limit the
right in view of other interests involved.
24. See D. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 1 (1972).
25. See Pound, supra note 23, at 363-64.
26. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
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Warren and Brandeis concluded that the right to life had come to
mean the right to enjoy life-the right to be left alone.27 In particular,
these two gentlemen were arguing for the right to be left alone from
newspapers and their unscrupulous reporting of the "news. ' ' 2s
At first this article had little impact upon the law,29 but then, little
by little, the idea that an individual was entitled to a certain amount of
privacy began to gain acceptance. In fact, three lower courts in New
York and a federal court in Massachusetts appeared quite ready to accept this premise.30 This trend, however, was brought to a temporary
halt when the Supreme Court of Michigan rejected the idea, 1 and to a
standstill when the high court in the State of New York refused to
27. Id.
28. Id. at 196. The authors state:
Of the desirability-indeed of the necessity-of some such protection,
there can, it is believed, be no doubt. The press is overstepping in every
direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer
the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is
pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the
details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily
papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle. The
intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have
rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual; but modern
enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected
him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere
bodily injury. Nor is the harm wrought by such invasions confined to the
suffering of those who may be made the subjects of journalistic or other
enterprise. In this, as in other branches of commerce, the supply creates the
demand. Each crop of unseemly gossip, thus harvested, becomes the seed of
more, and, in direct proportion to its circulation, results in a lowering of
social standards and of morality. Even gossip apparently harmless, when
widely and persistently circulated, is potent for evil. It both belittles and
perverts. It belittles by inverting the relative importance of things, thus
dwarfing the thoughts and aspirations of a people. When personal gossip
attains the dignity of print, and crowds the space available for matters of
real interest to the community, what wonder that the ignorant and thoughtless mistake its relative importance. Easy of comprehension, appealing to
that weak side of human nature which is never wholly cast down by the
misfortunes and frailties of our neighbors, no one can be surprised that it
usurps the place of interest in brains capable of other things. Triviality destroys at once robustness of thought and delicacy of feeling. No enthusiasm
can flourish, no generous impulse can survive under its blighting influence.

Id.
29. See Prosser, supra note 2, at 384.
30. See id. at 385.
31. Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 80 N.W. 285 (Mich. 1899) (where a
brand of cigars were named after individual, whom the court designated as public figure, no cause of action existed).
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acknowledge that an individual was entitled to a right of privacy.32
Three years later, however, the Supreme Court of Georgia recognized
the independent and distinct right of privacy and in so33 doing, issued a
decision that became the leading case on the subject.
Fifteen years after the publication of the Warren and Brandeis
article, the issue of one's right to privacy had been considered by three
courts of last resort in the United States, and as shown, the answer was
divided. This division was indicative of the cases that were to follow;
for every decision that subsequently recognized such a right, there was
another which denied it. Finally in 1939, the Restatement of Torts 3'
adopted the idea espoused half a century earlier by Warren and Brandeis, and slowly but surely the tide turned strongly in favor of recognition; the decisions rejecting recognition began to be outnumbered, and
in 1955 the Index of Legal Periodicals inserted the heading entitled
Privacy. This was the final impetus. Today the tort is recognized in one
form or another in virtually every jurisdiction in the United States.3 5
The road to recognition, however, was paved with a certain
amount of inconsistency and confusion. As the issue was presented in
the various states for the first time, the courts seemed to have scattered
in deciding what did in fact constitute an invasion of privacy. There
was, for example, no uniformity on whether or not malice had to be
proven, 36 although Warren and Brandeis had said it was not an ele32. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). Defendant flour company in this case used the picture of the plaintiff, a young lady, to advertise his product with the legend: "Flour of the Family." Id. The court refused to allow
her recovery when she sued for invasion of privacy saying that it was forced to take this
position on the basis of lack of precedent, the purely mental character~of the injury, the
risk of the flood of litigation should an action like this be allowed, the difficulty in
distinguishing between public and private figures, and the fear of undue limitations on
the constitutional freedom of the press. Id. at 443-47.
33. Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co., 50 S.E. 68, 68-69 (Ga. 1905).
In Pavesich, defendant insurance company used plaintiff's picture in one of its advertisements that appeared in a newspaper. Plaintiff brought suit alleging an invasion of
his privacy, and was allowed to recover. Id. at 81. The court took note of the fact that
prior to 1890, every adjudicated case which involved a right of privacy was decided on
some other ground such as supposed right of property, a breach of trust or confidence,
or the like, but that the time had come to recognize this new and independent right by
its own name. Id. at 75. Finding precedent in the natural law, Roman law and principles of municipal law, the court concluded that the Constitution of the United States
and the Constitution of Georgia guaranteed the right of privacy within certain limits to
all its citizens. Id. at 71-72. The court went on to note the conflict of its decision with
Roberson, but concluded that their decision was by far the most compelling, the most
logical and the one most likely to stand the test of time. Id. at 81.
34. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939) (liability will ensue for unreasonable
publication of another's affairs and/or likeness).
35. See supra note 11.
36. See, e.g., Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 178 N.Y.S. 752, 757 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1919). Humiston's picture had been used in an advertisement by the defendant, and the lower court had held that defendant's motive in so doing was important in
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ment to be considered. Likewise, there was no uniformity on the issue

whether the plaintiff had to establish special damages, 37 although Warren and Brandeis had said that they did not. Also, while all agreed that
the right to privacy had to be limited to "ordinary sensibilities,"3 8 there
was no consensus of opinion on how this was to be defined. 39 In addition, questions regarding elements of truth,40 public interest,41 and
third persons4 2 began to arise. These issues along with others caused
some courts to be perplexed when it came to defining the cause of action and determining what elements were required for an invasion of
privacy suit. Along with the courts, legal writers seem to have shared in
this difficulty and contributed to the confusion.4 Finally, the prevailing

disposing of the case. Id. at 753. On appeal, however, the court held: "It matters not
what may be the motive in the publishing of these films, whether instructive, or
whether to satisfy the morbid curiosity, any more than it matters what may be the
motive in the publishing of actual news items in a newspaper." Id. at 757.
37. See, e.g., Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076, 1079 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911) (although no specific loss is required to recover general damages, proof of malice may be
necessary to recover exemplary damages).
38. See Pound, supra note 23, at 363 (even though invasion of one's privacy is
mental and subjective, liability must be premised upon ordinary sensibilities).
39. See, e.g., Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 80 N.W. 285, 289 (Mich.
1899):
All men are not possessed of the same delicacy of feeling, or the same consideration for the feelings of others. These things depend greatly upon the
disposition and education. Some men are sensitive, some brutal. The former
will suffer keenly from an act or a word that will not affect the latter. Manifestly, the law cannot make a right of action depend upon the intent of the
alleged wrongdoer, or upon the sensitiveness of another.
40. See Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967, 970 (Ky. 1927) (neither truth of matter published nor absence of malice affords defense when dealing with unwarranted
invasion of right of privacy).
41. See, e.g., Smith v. Suratt, 7 Alaska 416, 423 (D. Alaska 1926). In Smith,
plaintiff was the director in charge of an expedition attempting to fly over the North
Pole. Defendant had threatened to accompany plaintiff, take pictures and sell them for
profit. As a result, plaintiff brought suit seeking an injunction on the basis that his
privacy was going to be invaded. The court held that there was no cause of action
because the undertaking was of public interest.
While there is an irreconcilable conflict of judicial authority on the proposition of the right of privacy, and while it is not necessary for this court to
decide whether such a right in fact exists or not, an enterprise of this public
character, financed as it may be by private individuals, who are necessarily
units of the public, there can be no right of privacy adhering to it.
Id.
42. See Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 95 P.2d 491, 495 (Cal. Ct. App.
1939). The Metter court held that a cause of action grounded in the invasion of an
individual's right of privacy is a personal one. Therefore, in order to recover one must
allege and prove an unreasonable invasion of his own right of privacy. Id. "In this
connection it becomes unnecessary to discuss the cases cited by appellant wherein the
courts have allowed recovery for the publication of a photograph where such publication was a breach of contract, or violation of a confidential relation." Id.
43. There seems to have been some question as to what a cause of action for the
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law achieved a state that, as previously mentioned, resembled "a haystack in a hurricane. 44 This is where Dean Prosser entered the foray.
Prosser told us that the action involved was not one, "but a complex of
four; ' 45 and as a result of the widespread adoption of his classification," the waters settled. The entrance of the Supreme Court of the
United States into this arena, the subsequent emergence of a penumbral right of privacy, the widespread use of the computer in our modern electronics age, and changes in the American lifestyle, however,
appear to have out-distanced Prosser's solution.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY

During the time that a cause of action was being developed in the
common law area of tort, decisions were being rendered in the sphere
of constitutional law along a parallel plane. The trend started with
cases involving criminal prosecution. The Supreme Court of the United
States, as early as the late 1940's, began to talk about a constitutional
right of privacy regarding improper methods of securing evidence, in
particular, the improper search and seizure of an individual's premises
or body.47 Since these early decisions, for the most part, involved the
invasion of one's privacy was suppose to cover. Writers, for example, did not always
agree on the scope of protection afforded by such a tort. See, e.g., D. FLAHERTY, supra
note 24, at 1 ("The meaning of privacy concerns the desire or right of an individual to
choose freely under what circumstances, and to what extent, they would expose themselves, their attitudes, and their behavior to others.");. A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON
PRIVACY 5 (1971) ("Privacy, like most concepts of fundamental value, is a relative
indeterminate concept that is not easily converted into a workable legal standard."); A.
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 31-32 (1967) ("Privacy actually embodies several different states of psychological and physical relationships between an individual and the
persons around him, which can be categorized as solitude, intimacy, anonymity and
reserve. The four states can be envisioned as varying facts of the privacy that individuals experience in their daily lives."). See also Nizer, supra note 4, at 540:
As the right of privacy has come to be an accepted branch of law, the
formless generalities with which it was launched have been crystallized into
recognizable legal principles. As more and more cases are placed on one side
or the other, the line of demarcation comes into sharper focus. This gradual
accretion of individual instances has built up a set of rules which are now
applied with sufficient consistency to make them useful not merely as shorthand summaries of past decisions, but also as guide-posts for future conduct.
Mr. Nizer then listed his five categories of privacy: matters of public interest; advertising or trade purposes; types of names and pictures; privacy after death; and consent. Id.
44. See supra note 13.
45. See supra note 6.
46. See supra notes 10-11.
47. See Wolf v. People of the State of Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
Wolf was convicted of conspiring to commit abortions. He alleged in part that the
evidence secured against him had been acquired unlawfully. The Supreme Court of the
United States affirmed the Supreme Court of Colorado's conviction. Id. The decision is
important to this discussion in that the Court addressed itself to the issue of privacy:
The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the po-
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obtaining of evidence in an illegal manner, they could properly be classified as intrusion cases, and as such would fit into one of Dean Pros-

ser's aforementioned categories.
Other cases, however, not involving illegal search and seizure were

beginning to arise and were eliciting dissenting opinions concerning an
individual's right to privacy. In an early case, for example, a state stat-

ute prohibiting the use of contraceptives was attacked on constitutional
grounds. The majority of the Court dismissed the suit, but in a strong
dissent Justice Harlan stated: "I believe that a statute making it a
criminal offense for married couples to use contraceptives is an intolerable and unjustifiable invasion of privacy in the conduct of the most
intimate concerns of an individual's personal life.""" Once this idea was
stated, it did not take long for the Supreme Court to take the final step

and develop the theory that we are all endowed with an inalienable
right to be left alone.
This principle was established in 1965, when the Supreme Court
held in Griswold v. Connecticut that a state statute which prohibited

the giving of contraceptive information was unconstitutional in that it
deprived married couples of the right of marital privacy guaranteed by
lice-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free
society. It is therefore implicit in the "concept of ordered liberty" and as
such enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause. The
knock at the door, whether by day or by night, as a prelude to a search,
without authority of law but solely on the authority of the police, did not
need the commentary of recent history to be condemned as inconsistent with
the conception of human rights enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples. Accordingly, we have no
hesitation in saying that were a State affirmatively to sanction such police
incursion into privacy it would run counter to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. See also Rochin v. People of California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). Rochin was
convicted of possessing an illegal drug (morphine). The evidence was obtained when a
deputy sheriff entered an open door of his house, forced open the door to the bedroom
and forcibly attempted to extract capsules which the accused had swallowed. Rochin
was subsequently taken to a local hospital where his stomach was pumped. As a result
of this induced vomiting, two capsules containing morphine were obtained and were
later introduced as evidence. As to the method employed in securing this evidence the
Court said:
[W]e are compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or
private sentimentalism about combatting crime too energetically. This is
conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy of the
petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the
forcible extraction of his stomach's contents-this course of proceeding by
agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened
sensibilities. They are methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit
of constitutional differentiation.
Id.

48.

Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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the Constitution. In so holding, the Court laid the foundation for the
idea that all individuals are entitled to a "zone of privacy." In addition,
the Court stated that this penumbral right was older than the Bill of
49
Rights itself
From this position, it was easy to project a civil right of privacy
which would come to include other areas of a person's life such as the
right of privacy in transmitting telephone messages, 50 the right of an
individual to obtain an abortion, 51 the right to marry a person of another race,52 and the right to die. 53 Some writers have taken the posi-

49. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965):
The present case, then, concerfis a relationship lying within the zone of
privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it
concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than
regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by means
having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship. Such a law
cannot stand in light of the familiar principle, so often applied by this
Court, that a "governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is
repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than
our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.
50. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). In Katz, the government listened to and recorded defendant's conversation while he used a public phone.
The Court held that:
The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the
petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while
using the telephone booth and thus constituted a "search and seizure"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic
device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of
the booth can have no constitutional significance.
Id.
51. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). Roe held that a Texas statute
prohibiting abortions at any stage of pregnancy except to save the life of the mother,
was unconstitutional in that it was an unreasonable invasion of the mother's right of
privacy. Id. "This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action

. . .

or.

.

.in the

Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id.
52. See Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967.) (the Supreme
Court struck down a Virginia antimiscegenation statute on the basis that it violated the
Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the fourteenth amendment).
53. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
922 (1976). Quinlan's father sought to be appointed the guardian of the person and
property of his 21 year old daughter who was in a persistent vegetative state, and
sought the express power authorizing the discontinuance of all extraordinary procedures for sustaining the daughter's vital processes. The court held that the patient's
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tion that the right of privacy guaranteed by the Constitution is very
personal in nature; that it extends only "to matters of marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.""' In fact this very position has been stated by the Supreme Court
itself. 55 Other cases, however, make it clear that the right of privacy is
not limited to these familial matters, but in fact extends to many other

areas in an individual's life.56

There is some inherent risk in attempting to summarize forty
years of constitutional law in such a short space, but in final analysis it
can be said that the constitutional right of privacy protects a person
5
from unwanted state regulation in their consensual transactions. 7
More specifically, it can be said that while the common law right of
privacy protects a person from other individuals, the constitutional
right of privacy protects a person from unreasonable interference from
the State. It should be emphasized that this right is not expressly
granted by the Constitution, but instead has been derived from case
law, and as such is affected by the prevailing philosophy of the Court.
This mood tends to vary. The pendulum may swing from a liberal ap-

right of privacy gave her the right to decline medical treatment.
Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention a right of privacy, Supreme Court decisions have recognized that a right of personal privacy exists and that certain areas of privacy are guaranteed under the Constitution . . . . [T]his right is broad enough to encompass a patient's
decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances, in much
the same way as it is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to
terminate pregnancy under certain conditions.
Id.
54. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 7, at 866-67.
55. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973):
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a
line of decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as . . . [1891] . . . the
Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of
certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution ....
These decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed
"fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," . . . are included in this guarantee of personal privacy. They also make it clear that
the right has some extension to activities relating to marriage, . . . procreation, '. . . contraception, . . . family relationships, . . . and child rearing
and education.
Id. at 152-53.
56. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that unauthorized eavesdropping of an individual's conversation on a public phone was an invasion
of his privacy).
57. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). Under authority of a warrant to search Stanley's home for evidence of his alleged bookmaking activities, the
police found films in his bedroom. The films were projected and deemed to be obscene
and appellant was arrested for their possession. Id. at 558. The Court held that obtaining the evidence in this manner violated Stanley's right of privacy guaranteed to
him by the Constitution. Id. at 564.
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proach to one that is conservative,58 but in each case the underlying
issue is whether the invasion by the government is an unreasonable one.
III. ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY
The age of electronic technology did not arrive on the scene in full
bloom. It has, however, enjoyed a phenomenal period of development
and advancement during the last several decades. In the 1940's and
1950's, for example, an average computer with its vacuum tubes took
up the space of a small room. With the subsequent invention of the
transistor, computers became much smaller; however, it was the next
generation that enjoyed a multi-faceted quantum leap forward. This
was attributable in large part to the introduction of the silicon chip. An
inch-square "miracle chip" which can be mass produced by just about
any country in the world today, now has the calculating capabilities of
an entire roomful of computer hardware of the 1940's and 1950's. Not
only has the equipment decreased in size, but it has also become less
expensive and much more efficient. For example, a million dollar computing capacity of three decades ago now costs a mere twenty dollars
and, in addition, is 100,000 times quicker.59 In fact, the technological
developments have been so drastic that it is extremely difficult for individuals of our generation to comprehend them. Two thousand pieces of
information, for example, can now be stored on a silicon chip the size
of the head of a pin, and the cost of this maneuver has declined more
than eighty percent in the last two years. 60 When one considers that
next to oxygen, silicon is the most abundant element on Earth,61 it boggles the mind to consider the tremendous changes that these technological advancements will bring upon society as we know it today.
As computers continue to become more advanced, elaborate, and
58. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 2843-44 (1986). Hardwick,
who was discovered committing an act of sodomy in his bedroom with another consenting adult male, was charged with violating a Georgia criminal statute. Id. at 2841.
The lower court held that the statute violated his fundamental rights because the homosexual activity was a private and intimate association that was beyond the reach of
state regulation. Id. at 2843. However, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that an individual's right to privacy did not extend to homosexual activity. Id. "We
first register our disagreement with the Court of Appeals and with respondent [defendant] that the Court's prior cases have construed the Constitution to confer a right of
privacy that extends to homosexual sodomy and for all intents and purposes have decided this case." Id. The Court then cited cases dealing with child rearing and education, family relationships, procreation, contraception and abortion and concluded "[w]e
think it evident that none of the rights announced in those cases bears any resemblance
to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is
asserted in this case." Id. at 2844.
59. See Linowes, Must PersonalPrivacy Die in the Computer Age?, 65 A.B.A. J.
1180, 1182 (1979).
60. Id. at 1181.
61.

Id.
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versatile, they will continue to have profound effects on events in our
daily lives.62 They will be used to store not only that information which
is already in the public domain, but also increasingly to store sensitive
information about one's personal life.13 This penchant for record keeping has, oddly enough, been brought about by our own society. The
record-keeping capabilities of the computer age has induced the government as well as private industry to keep what up to now would have
been considered unimaginable and voluminous records of the various
activities of individuals. 4 This impetus has been attributable to three
sociological factors of our modern day society: 1) a tremendous expansion in the use of credit; 2) the unparalleled mobility of our population;
and 3) the enormous increase in the work force.6" In fact, an argument
could be made that without the technology of the computer age, these
three phenomena could not have taken place. It is because of modern
day computers that we can use charge cards anywhere in the world,
moving from place to place and still have credit where no one has firsthand knowledge of our financial resources. No one can dispute the fact
that these activities have brought armies of individuals into the work
force, which in turn has enabled more individuals to seek credit and
move about at will. 6 The circle is endless.
The point to be made, however, is that this tremendous increase in
record-keeping capabilities has greatly increased the potential for
abuse. Now that it is easier, cheaper, and in some cases profitable,6 7 to
62. See Asimov, The Next 70 Years for Law and Lawyers, 71 A.B.A. J. 56, 59
(1985). Asimov reasons that as computers become more elaborate and versatile and
can cope with the complexities of the law, there will be fewer appeals, fewer strategies
of delay, faster and shorter trials, more settlements and fewer cases brought to trial in
the first place.
63. See Freedman, The Right of Privacy in the Age of Computer Data and
Processing, 13 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 1361, 1363 (1982) ("Under the onslaught of the
escalating spiral of data processing, dossier-building, and record-keeping, the individual
is steadily losing control over personal information.").
64. Id. at 1368.
65. Id. (citing a 1977 study compiled by the United States Privacy Protection
Study Commission as the authority for this statement).
66. See Comment, The Use and Abuse of Computerized Information: Striking a
Balance Between Personal Privacy Interests and OrganizationalInformation Needs,
44 ALB. L. REV. 589, 589 (1980):
Prior to the evolution of computerized record-keeping, most business decisions concerning such benefits as credit, insurance, and medical care were
based upon personal knowledge of the individuals involved and upon the limited types of information which could be obtained from friends, associates
and a decentralized system of public records. The inefficiency of these
sources and methods of information collection operated to preserve a measure of individual privacy. The details of a person's life were maintained, if
at all, in the manual files and memories of the persons and organizations
with whom he had dealt, creating considerable obstacles for one seeking to
compile a detailed dossier on an individual.
67. See Note, supra note 15, at 570 (the author states that in addition to the
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gather and store such vast amounts of information, there is greater risk
that this information will be misused, and the privacy of the individual
invaded. For example, since the 1920's, the FBI has maintained files on
certain individuals and has made most of this information available to
authorized agencies and institutions.68 That most of this information is
now computerized in one central criminal data system at the National
Crime Information Center makes its abuse highly probable.
For one thing, the computer system is subject to electronic penetration as well as other forms of illegal access.69 In addition, because
the information is abbreviated and entered in abstract form, it is more
likely that it will be misunderstood.70 Finally, since there is no opportunity for anyone to correct or delete erroneous data, the label of "criminal" becomes inescapable even for those who have been rehabilitated
and seek to lead normal lives,71 as well as for those who were innocent.
In fact, this last situation is a problem of concern and one that has
caused a great deal of controversy. 2 Arrest records, for example, which
contain no disposition, or arrest records of persons who have been acquitted or against whom charges have been dismissed continue to be
carried.7 As a result, a mere arrest, or an arrest followed by complete
exoneration may continue to have a disastrous impact on an individual's life, career, and future.74
A second example of potential misuse of computerized information
is in the area of personal medical records. No patient would decline to
accede to a doctor's or hospital's request for detailed information concerning not only their physical condition, but their ability to pay as
well. And no one under these circumstances would ever think of inquiring as to either the necessity for the compilation of this data or the
existence of any provisions for its secure storage and subsequent use.75
Generally, doctors and hospitals generate this type of medical data primarily for use in the treatment of the patient as well as for research,
subsequent planning, and evaluation of that individual's care. 6 This
personal medical information, however, has become an increasingly valfederal government, several industries in the private sector maintain extensive computerized data files which in some instances are provided by other companies).
68. See Hemphill, Protection of Privacy of Computerized Records in the National Crime Information Center, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 594 (1974).
69. Id. at 599.
70. Id. at 599-600.
71. Id. at 600.
72. See Comment, Privacy, Law Enforcement, and Public Interest: Computerized Criminal Records, 36 MONT. L. REV. 60, 65-66 (1975).
73. Id. at 65.
74. Id. at 66.
75. See Note, Electronic Data Processingin Private Hospitals: Patient Privacy,
Confidentiality and Control, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1386, 1387 (1979).
76. Id. at 1390.
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uable commodity in today's marketplace." It can be sold for a profit.7 8
This data is highly valued by such institutions providing unrelated
health care services as life insurance companies, future employers and
credit bureaus. 79 Once again, the fact that former patients do not have
the opportunity to correct or delete outdated or erroneous material, and
the fact that they do not know into whose hands this information will
ultimately come, makes an intrusion into one's privacy highly probable.
The other side of the argument, however, is that privacy in an
organized civilization such as ours cannot be absolute; instead, it must
be balanced against the other needs of society. 80 In other words, there
may be, in some situations, a legitimate use for information of this
kind. For example, it would be naive to think that FBI or other law
enforcement information never reaches prospective employers. 81 And
although a patient's legitimate expectation of privacy regarding his
medical records should be maintained, it is equally clear that many
legitimate and worthwhile uses are made of this data. 82 These uses, for
example, would include medical research; public health emergencies
such as the isolation of carriers of Legionnaire's Disease, AIDS, and
other epidemics; audits of institutions which receive Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal or state health subsidies; review by insurance
companies for eligibility and determination claims processing; investigations by welfare and other social service agencies in order to provide
needed services; and analyses by professional accrediting agencies to
evaluate the quality of services being rendered.8 3 These uses would be
seriously impaired, or in some cases rendered impossible, by any rule
which would create an absolute right of privacy for each individual. In
many instances, the public good must outweigh the individual's right to
privacy, and these would be examples of such a situation. In fact, if we
demand more services, it is only reasonable to expect that this type of
"personal" information will become even more sought after. The result
will be that the abuse of one's right to privacy will become more and
more of a certainty.8 4

77.
78.
79.
80.
545, 547
81.
82.

Id. at 1386.
See supra note 64.
See Note, supra note 75, at 1390.
See Farley, Computers-Data-Privacy:A Mobius Effect, 47 PENN. B.A. Q.
(1976).
See supra note 72, at 67.
See Freedman, supra note 63, at 1371.

83. Id.
84. See Linowes, supra note 59, at 1182:

From government we expect social security, unemployment compensation,

guaranteed mortgage loans, and all levels of welfare. From business, we expect credit cards that give us instant credit approval any place in the world

and the ability to make plane reservations in a matter of minutes for any
kind of trip to anywhere.

Administrators responsible for furnishing these services must satisfy
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SITUATIONS WHEREIN THE EXISTING RULE DOES NOT APPLY

The pattern is clear. The government and private industry, due to
advancements in electronic technology, have unlimited opportunities to
' 5
violate what was once described as "the right to be left alone." If the
culprit in these instances is the government, there is no question that if
8
the interference is unreasonable, the injured party has a civil action.
The problem arises in the area of the person's common law right to
relief. In some instances as we have seen, the rights of the individual
must be balanced against the needs of society, and as a result the injured plaintiff may go without a remedy. In other cases, the formula
derived by Dean Prosser8 7 regarding an invasion of privacy does not fit.
Due to technological advances in the last two to three decades, fact
situations are arising wherein the existing four classifications of privacy
do not apply. The situations discussed above regarding dissemination of
computerized criminal and medical records are examples of such inap-

plicability. If, for instance, one's criminal record were disclosed to a
future employer, or if one's medical record were disclosed to a prospective insurance carrier, there is a general consensus that the existing tort
law does not provide a remedy. 8 Of the four classifications created by
themselves of a person's eligibility by demanding and getting much personal,
often sensitive, information. So more and more confidential data [is] being
injected into the stream of government and business, never to be destroyed.
Applying for life insurance, buying something on credit, opening a bank
account, filling out various forms in order to get hospitalization or insurance
benefits-all these add personal information to the network.
..Some insurance companies, employers and others are a market for
this information. When you deal with organizations that use these services,
they may know more about your medical condition that you, since medical
ethics do not allow a patient to see his own records. Laws are inadequate to
protect against this kind of behavior that apparently is sponsored throughout
the country by some of the largest companies.
It should be noted that when a person applies for insurance, in most
cases the authorization form he signs is a "search warrant without due process," as characterized by one insurance executive. It authorizes any organization to release all information, not just medical data, it may have about
the person; it has no expiration date; and it indicates that a copy is as valid
as the original.
To be sure, insurance companies need information about a prospective
insured. They need it to calculate risk and to guard against fraud. The kind
of information they need is sensitive and personal. Adequately safeguarding
this information from abuse is complex and not always within the control of
the insurance companies.
85. See supra note 9.
86. See supra notes 59-84 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 7.
88. See Note, supra note 75, at 1404:
Actions for the tort of invasion of privacy generally cover four situa-
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Dean Prosser, only one may appear to be on point-public disclosure of
private facts; this action, however, requires that the defendant disseminate the information to the public at large.8 9 Since this element, in our
fact situations, would be lacking, the cause of action would be inapplicable. However, even if a privacy action were available, the defense of
qualified privilege would still bar the action. 90 This makes it clear that
the existing law is not adequate to protect an injured plaintiff. Modern
technology has outdistanced the rule of law.
In addition, other modern day activities, not necessarily created by
our electronic technology, are mentioned at this point to underscore the
need for a revision of our privacy laws. These activities are centered on
the changes that have come about in the American lifestyle. For one,
the rights of nonsmokers versus smokers has in many instances created
a great deal of discussion. Any airplane, restaurant, work place, or
public building, for example, now has restricted areas for smoking. In
other situations nonsmokers have attempted to prohibit this activity 91
92
alleging an invasion of their privacy only to be overruled by the court.
Apparently, the law does not yet offer a blanket protection to an individual from smoke filled air.
Another example of where changes in the American lifestyle call
for a change in our existing law involves drugs and alcohol. They have

tions, only one of which might apply to disclosures of medical record information: public revelation of the details of an individual's private life. This

privacy action, however, requires that the defendant communicate the private information to the public at large. Moreover, the cases recognizing a

tortious invasion in the health care area have dealt either with public disclosure concerning unusual illnesses or with medical research which publicized
the identities of the subjects. Medical record disclosures typically are not

made to the general public, thus rendering inapplicable an invasion of privacy action.
89. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment a (1977)
(communication to single person or even to small group of individuals is not actionable
as invasion of privacy).

90. This defense is usually associated with a cause of action involving defamation. It is also applicable, however, in actions for an invasion of privacy. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 596 (1977) (conditional privilege applies where person
with common interest in alleged plaintiff shares information with another).
91. See, e.g., Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District, 418 F. Supp.
716 (E.D. La. 1976), aft'd, 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073
(1979) (plaintiff nonsmokers brought action against operators of Louisiana Superdome

to enjoin use of tobacco smoking in superdome during events staged therein).
92. Id. at 721:

The plaintiffs herein contend that the right to be free from hazardous smoke
fumes caused by the smoking of tobacco is as fundamental as the right of

privacy recognized in the Griswold decision. This Court does not agree. To
hold that the First, Fifth, Ninth or Fourteenth Amendments recognize as
fundamental the right to be free from cigarette smoke would be to mock the

lofty purposes of such amendments and broaden their prenumbral protections to unheard-of boundaries.
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in some areas become more common, and as a result employers are
beginning to ask their employees to submit to blood tests and/or urinalysis for drug testing. If this is an invasion of one's right to be left alone,
employers are justifying their conduct on four generally accepted
grounds. First, studies have shown that individuals who are involved in
alcohol or drug abuse have greater health care needs, are absent more
often, are more likely to be involved in work-related accidents, and are
more likely to require disciplinary action. Second, recent cases more
often than not hold an employer liable for the conduct of their employees. 94 Whether the employer failed to investigate an applicant's criminal record, 95 or sent home an intoxicated employee, 98 there is a tendency on the part of our judicial system to impose liability on the
employer for this alleged negligence.97 Third, security problems in the
work place have broadened from concern about theft of office supplies,
production line goods, and articles belonging to other employees, to
concerns about theft and subsequent disclosures of confidential information and trade secrets. 98 Finally, a philosophical change appears to
have occurred in the work place. The idea used to be that whatever an
employee did on his own time was his business. Now the concept seems
to be that employees represent their employers twenty-four hours a day
and therefore are accountable to their employers during nonworking
time. 9 As a result, there is an increasing concern over alcohol and substance abuse, and as shown, this concern exhibits itself during the employment process.
If an employee must submit to a test, and if the result is communicated to another individual, does this constitute an invasion of privacy,
and if so, may the injured party sue for relief? The answer to both
questions under existing law appears to be no.100 As in those cases in93. See Lehr & Middlebrooks, Work-Place Privacy Issues and Employer
Screening Policies, I1 EMPL. REL. L.J. 407, 407 (1986).
94. Id. 407-08.
95. See supra note 81.
96. See, e.g., Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 308 (Tex.
1983) (employer could be held liable for automobile accident and resulting death of
plaintiff's wife caused by intoxicated employee, who had history of drinking at work
and was intoxicated on night in question).
97. See Lehr & Middlebrooks, supra note 93, at 407-08:
A second factor used to justify screening is that, more and more frequently,
employe'rs are being held responsible for the actions of employees. The subjects of recent litigation range from alleged negligence during the pre-employment screening process in failing to inquire about an applicant's criminal record to negligence in sending home an intoxicated employee who
subsequently became involved in an automobile accident. In such cases, the
employer's duty to the public at large regarding the actions of its employees
has been expanded.
98. Id. at 408.
99. Id.
100. See supra note 18.
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volving disclosure of criminal misconduct,' 0 and disclosure of medical
records, 0 2 the law of privacy does not protect an individual in this sort
of situation. The reasoning for this position is twofold. First, the test
itself is not an unreasonable intrusion into an individual's seclusion. 05
As discussed above, there is in many instances a need for an employer
to know whether or not an employee is dependent upon drugs or alcohol. ° ' Consequently, such a test would not offend a reasonable person,
and as a result there would be no invasion of privacy under the existing
law.' 0 5 Secondly, if only the employer or a small group of people are
aware of the test results, there would be no public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff and there would therefore be no
cause of action. 06 Once again the injured plaintiff would be left without a remedy.
V. THE NEED FOR A NEW RULE

In light of the new grievances that may arise due to advancements
in the field of electronic technology and the changes in our American

lifestyle, a new definition pertaining to an individual's right to be left
alone should be formulated. As shown by the previous discussion, these
advancements and changes have outdistanced the rule advanced by
Dean Prosser in 1960. The new standard that should be adopted in

determining whether an individual's right of privacy has been violated
is that of the reasonably prudent person. In other words, whether the
conduct or activity in question constitutes an invasion of one's common
law right to be left alone, free of interference from outside agencies,
should depend upon the reasonableness of the conduct or activity under
the circumstances in question.
This position is justified on five grounds. First, this rule would
align the law of privacy with various other torts. The reasonableness of
defendant's behavior in many instances is the test for determining

101. See supra notes 88-90.
102. Id.
103. See supra note 7.
104. See supra notes 93-97.
105. See supra note 7.
106. See, e.g., Rycroft v. Gaddy, 314 S.E.2d 39, 43 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984). In
Rycroft, plaintiff's bank records were subpoenaed and viewed by the opposing party

and his attorney. The court held that this did not constitute an invasion of privacy since
there was no publicity.
The disclosure of private facts must be a public disclosure, and not a private

one; there must be, in other words, publicity. It is publicity, as opposed to
publication, that gives rise to a cause of action for invasion of privacy. Communication to a single individual or to a small group of people, absent a
breach of contract, trust, or other confidential relationship, will not give rise

to liability.
Id. (citations omitted).
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whether or not a plaintiff has a cause of action. This is true, for example, in the area of negligence, 107 medical malpractice relating to informed consent, 08 the duty owed by occupiers of land,109 good faith in
retaining property in conversion cases, 110 parent-child cases wherein the
doctrine of parental immunity has been abolished,"' private nuisance,11 2 malicious prosecution," 3 defamation," 14 and products liability
cases. 115 The concept of reasonableness can also be found in mental
anguish, "6s assault and battery,"17 false imprisonment,"" and fraudu107. See Lovell v. Oahe Electric Cooperative, 382 N.W.2d 396, 398 (S.D. 1986)
("Under common law, negligence is the failure to exercise ordinary care under the
circumstances. Ordinary care is that which an ordinarily prudent or reasonable person
would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.").
108. See Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1132 (Me. 1980) ("Under the
objective test, a causal connection exists between the defendant's failure to disclose and
the plaintiff's injury only if a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff would
have declined the treatment had he been apprised of the risk that resulted in harm.").
109. See Limberhand v. Big Ditch Company, 706 P.2d 491, 498 (Mont. 1985)
("The apartment owners owed a duty in this case to use ordinary care to have their
premises reasonably safe or to warn of any hidden or lurking danger.").
110. See Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation v. Shepler, 329 N.E.2d 620, 624
(Ind. Ct. App. 1975) ("Therefore, the good faith should be further subject to the test
that the determination thereof would have been one made by a 'reasonable man' under
the same set of facts or circumstances.").
111. See Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 601 (Minn. 1980) (overruled the
doctrine of parental immunity replacing it with the rule that liability should be established on basis of whether a parent acted as reasonable and prudent individual under
like or similar circumstances).
112. See Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182, 187 (Wis. 1982):
This state has long recognized that an owner of land does not have an absolute or unlimited right to use the land in a way which injures the rights of
others. The rights of neighboring landowners are relative; the uses by one
must not unreasonably impair the uses of enjoyment of the other.
113. See Board of Education of Miami Trace Local School District v. Marting,
185 N.E.2d 583 (Ohio 1961). In determining whether the plaintiff had probable cause
in brining suit, the court stated: "The reasonable man test is applicable in determining
probable cause, namely, would a reasonable man have believed and acted under the
same circumstances existent at the time as did Marting and his counsel herein." Id. at
594.
114. See Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star and Tribune Company, 367 N.W.2d 476,
491 (Minn. 1985) ("We hold that a private individual may recover actual damages for
a defamatory publication upon proof that the defendant knew or in the exercise of
reasonable care should have known that the defamatory statement was false.").
115. See Aim v. Aluminum Company of America, 717 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tex.
1986) ("Alcoa had a duty to warn of the hazards associated with its closure technology
if a reasonably prudent person in the same position would have warned of the
hazards.").
116. See Moore v. Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d 683, 688 (Tex. 1987) ("In the court's
charge in wrongful death cases, mental anguish shall be defined as the emotional pain,
torment, and suffering that the named plaintiff would, in reasonable probability, experience from the death of the family member.").
117. See Jahner v. Jacob, 233 N.W.2d 791, 798 (N.D. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 870 (1975) ("This necessarily means that the defendant must have some reasona-
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lent misrepresentation," 9 as well as in other areas of tort. 120
Second, if this rule of reasonableness governing the right of privacy were adopted, it would coincide with its constitutional counterpart.122 There is no urgency in having an individual's civil right of privacy governed by the same rule as his common law right to be left
alone, but there is some advantage to uniformity. Under the proposed
rule, whether the defendant is the government or an agency thereof, or
an individual who has interfered with the plaintiff's daily life, the rule
would be the same.
Third, a test of reasonableness would create a standard for determining whether one's privacy had been invaded which is simple, flexible, and easy for a jury to apply. It is a test with which our judicial
system is well acquainted. 22 As one court has said: "Our system of
justice places great faith in juries ...

"23

In other words, whether

an individual has sustained an injury to his right to be left alone would
no longer involve four different types of tests, but in all cases would
come down to a question of fact.
Fourth, this standard of reasonableness could offer an injured
plaintiff a remedy where the existing rules of law do not. As we have
seen from the above discussion, there are some events wherein a plaintiff's right to privacy has been invaded and the existing law does not
offer a remedy.12 1 Whether one's prior criminal record is shown to a
ble basis for believing himself to be in danger. It does not permit mere conjuration or
imagination of being in great danger without a reasonable basis therefore, and it does
not permit responding with unnecessary great or devastating force.").
118. See Butler v. W.E. Walker Stores, Inc., 222 So.2d 128, 130 (Miss. 1969)
(construing a state statute providing that proprietor could stop and search someone if
plaintiff's activities were such as would tend to arouse suspicion of reasonable person
under same or similar circumstances).
119. See Cook v. Brown, 393 So.2d 1016, 1019 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981):
Although a plaintiff alleged to have been injured by a defendant's misrepresentation must have in fact acted upon it to his injury believing it to be true
to maintain his action for fraud against the defendant, if he had prior
knowledge of its falsity or if the circumstances surrounding the pronouncement of same would have aroused suspicion as to its validity in the mind of
a reasonable person, he cannot be said to have reasonably relied upon the
misrepresentation and, therefore, cannot obtain damages or other relief from
defendant.
120. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Taylor, 174 S.W.2d 844, 850 (Mo. 1943) (holding that
even though the landlord owed no duty to the tenant to repair the premises, once he
undertook to do so, he must exercise reasonable care).
121. See supra notes 59-84 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 107-20.
123. Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595, 600 (Minn. 1980) (wherein the
court was concerned with replacing the doctrine of parental immunity with a test of
whether the parent had acted in a reasonable manner under the circumstances in
question).
124. See supra notes 18, 88, 92.
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prospective employer,125 or an individual's medical history is shown to
someone outside the field of medicine,1 26 the reasonableness of this disclosure would now govern a plaintiff's right to recover, and not the required element of publicity. 27 In other words, a plaintiff might be compensated if such invasion were unreasonable even though the
information in question was not brought to the attention of a large segment of the public.
Finally, this proposed standard of reasonableness would offer a
plaintiff a remedy in new areas not contemplated when Dean Prosser
set forth his rule. Changes in the American lifestyle have brought
about new opportunities to violate an individual's right to be left alone,
and as seen, the existing law does not offer a remedy.1 28 The reasonableness of the defendant's behavior in these situations would offer a
plaintiff more protection.
CONCLUSION

There have been dramatic changes in the areas of technology, business and our daily lives since Warren and Brandeis first published
their law review article dealing with an individual's right to privacy.1 29
These gentlemen are responsible for bringing about the recognition of
an individual's right to be left alone even though the common law did
not recognize the tort. As is often the case, this new position brought
about much confusion'" until Dean Prosser set forth his new rule in
1960.131 Since then, however, the entry of the Supreme Court of the
United States into this area,13 2 as well as advancements in the field of
electronic technology 133 and changes in our American lifestyle1 3 ' have
brought about a need for an additional modification of our current law.
Replacing the existing law with a standard of reasonableness for determining whether one's right to privacy has been violated, is a change
that will bring this tort into a proper perspective for the Twenty-First
Century.

125.
126.
127.
128.

See
See
See
See

supra note 81.
supra note 82.
supra note 89.
supra notes 18, 88, 92.

129. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26.
130.

See Ettmore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Co., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d

Cir. 1956) (the state of the law was described as resembling "a haystack in a
hurricane").
131. See Prosser, supra note 2.
132.
133.
134.

See supra notes 47-58.
See supra notes 15-17.
See supra note 18.

